A Note on Sabotage in Collective Tournaments by Gürtler, Oliver
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2005 
 
 
*Oliver Gürtler, Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, 
Germany. Tel.:+49-228-739214, Fax:+49-228-739210. oliver.guertler@uni-bonn.de  
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 61 
A Note on Sabotage in Collective 
Tournaments 
Oliver Gürtler* 
ANote on Sabotage in Collective Tournaments
Oliver Gürtler
Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany
Abstract
In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is ana-
lyzed, where each contestant may spend productive e¤ort in order to increase his
teams performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown
that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases their teams
performance more signicantly than sabotaging stronger members does. As a
consequence, sabotage activities are only directed at a teams weaker members.
This nding is quite interesting, as previous results on individual tournaments
indicate that oftentimes only the stronger participants should be sabotaged.
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1 Introduction
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
The relevance of this saying can be conrmed in many real-world settings:
Computer hackers, for instance, nd new weaknesses in Microsofts programs
nearly every weak. In the past, these weaknesses allowed several computer
worms to disperse and to do considerable harm: According to the Computer
Crime Research Center, estimations of economic losses in January 2004 caused
by malicious software range from $ 63.4 to $ 77.5 billion.
Similarly, important advantages in historic battles have been achieved by
employing a battle strategy exploiting a weakness of the opponent army. Ex-
amples include the rst Battle of Narva, where Charles XII of Sweden made
use of a weakness in fortication to defeat Russian army that was clearly pre-
dominant in size, or the siege of Alesia, where, again a weakness in fortication,
almost led to the end of Roman emperor Julius Caesar.
The observation that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, should
also a¤ect strategies in tournaments between teams (so-called collective tourna-
ments).1 These tournaments are ubiquitous in practice: For the reconstruction
of the World Trade Centre, e.g., eight international teams of architects pre-
sented suggestions, how to design the new building. Finally, the proposal of
an architect team from Berlin was selected. The selection process had all the
characteristics of a tournament: The architect teams were in competition for a
given prize (here the fame and monetary gain from designing the new World
Trade Centre) and spent resources, while developing their proposals. Other ex-
amples for collective tournaments include tournaments between research teams
or, most obviously, sports tournaments.
As is known from the literature on tournaments between individuals (see
e.g. Lazear (1989), Konrad (2000), Chen (2003), Münster (2004) or Kräkel
(2005)), sabotage is an e¤ective instrument to improve ones own position in a
tournament and is empirically relevant (see Garicano & Palacios-Huerta (2000)).
Yet, sabotage in collective tournaments has not been analyzed so far, although
it raises interesting, new questions. Most importantly, if competing against a
heterogeneous team, who should be sabotaged more, the weaker or the stronger
members? The introductory examples indicate that the answer should be the
weaker members, as these members are less robust to sabotage activities.
In a tournament model, this conclusion will be shown to be right. Sabotage
activities are always directed at the team members that are most essential for
team success, i.e., the team members whose marginal product is highest. We
will see that these are always the weaker (or, in the terminology of the model,
the less able) team members. This result is due to two e¤ects, a decreasing-
returns e¤ect and a complementarity e¤ect. The former e¤ect stems from
the assumption that there are decreasing returns to e¤ort so that team members
exerting higher e¤ort (that are the more able team members) are, on the margin,
1See, for a formal analysis of collective tournaments, Drago et al. (1996).
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less productive. Complementarities between team membersactivities yield the
second e¤ect. As able team memberse¤orts are higher, complementarities in
team production lead to a relatively higher increase in productivity of less able
members. Summarizing, both e¤ects imply that less able team members are, on
the margin, more productive and, as a consequence, are subject to all sabotage
activities.
The note is organized as follows: The next section describes the model, while
section 3 contains the model solution and the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Description of the model and notation
Consider a tournament between two teams, each consisting of one able and one
less able player. All players are assumed to be risk-neutral. The teams compete
for an exogenously given winner-prize w that is equally divided between the
winner-teams members. Let players 1 and 2 be the members of the rst team
and let the second team consist of players 3 and 4. Player i (i=1, 2, 3, 4)
exerts productive e¤ort ei  0 and sabotage e¤orts sij  0 (j= 1, 2, 3, 4,
j 6= i) at cost iC (ei) + K (
P
sij). The parameter i stands for player is
ability. A lower i corresponds to a more able player, i.e., a player being able
to perform at lower costs. Suppose that 1 = 3 = 1, 2 = 4 =: L > 1
and that the playersabilities are common knowledge.2 C () is an increasing
and convex function satisfying C (0) = 0; Ce (ei) = 0, for ei 2 [0; ] with  > 0
and  ! 0 and Ce (ei) = 1, for ei ! 1, where the subscript denotes the rst
derivative with respect to e¤ort. The second condition on C () says that, up to
a strictly positive level of , marginal e¤ort costs are zero. Sabotage costs are
assumed to only depend on overall sabotage. The single sabotage activities are
therefore perfect substitutes for each player. Further, K () is supposed to be
increasing, convex and satisfying K (0) = 0, Ks (0) = 0 and Ks (
P
sij) = 1,
for
P
sij ! 1.3 Dene xi := max
n
ei  
P
j 6=i sji; 0
o
as the e¤ective e¤ort
of a player, that is, his e¤ort net o¤ incurred sabotage.4 Team outputs are then
assumed to be given by
y1 = f (x1; x2) + 1 and y2 = f (x3; x4) + 2: (1)
The function f is assumed to satisfy the following four properties: (i) f is con-
tinuously di¤erentiable and increasing in both arguments, (ii) f exhibits decreas-
ing returns to e¤ective e¤ort, given the other e¤ective e¤ort remains constant,
(iii) there are complementarities between both e¤ective e¤orts, (iv) f is sym-
metric. Formally, the second, third and fourth property translate into f11 < 0
2Note that the "L" stands for low-ability players and not for low-cost player.
3The subscript denotes the rst derivative with respect to sabotage e¤ort.
4The sabotage cost function is assumed to be su¢ ciently steeper than the productive e¤ort
cost function. Thus, e¤ective e¤orts are non-negative on the equilibrium path so that, when
solving the model, the maximum operator can be omitted.
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(and f22 < 0), f12 > 0 and f (a; b) = f (b; a).5 1 and 2 describe random
components being continuously, identically and independently distributed with
mean  and variance 2. Using (1), the rst teams winning-probability can
be written as P1 := Pr ob fy1 > y2g =: H (f (x1; x2)  f (x3; x4)), where H ()
denotes the distribution function of the composed random variable 2   1, and
h () the corresponding density function. Similarly, the winning-probability of
team 2 is given by P2 = 1 H (f (x1; x2)  f (x3; x4)).
3 Solution to the model
We explicitly derive the solution for player 1. Other derivations are completely
analogous. Player 1 chooses (productive and destructive) e¤orts to maximize
his expected payo¤, which equals his expected payment minus costs entailed by
(both kinds of) e¤ort.
EU1 =
w
2H (f (x1; x2)  f (x3; x4))  1C (e1) K (s12 + s13 + s14).
Obviously, player 1 chooses s12 = 0. This is very intuitive, for sabotaging
ones own teammate decreases the probability of winning and additionally leads
to higher costs. The rst-order conditions concerning his other e¤ort choices
are given by6
@EU1
@e1
=
w
2
h (f (x1; x2)  f (x3; x4)) f1 (x1; x2)  1Ce (e1)  0 (2)
(= 0; for e1 > 0) ;
@EU1
@s13
=
w
2
h (f (x1; x2)  f (x3; x4)) f1 (x3; x4) Ks (s13 + s14)  0 (3)
(= 0; for s13 > 0) ;
@EU1
@s14
=
w
2
h (f (x1; x2)  f (x3; x4)) f2 (x3; x4) Ks (s13 + s14)  0 (4)
(= 0; for s14 > 0) :
Note that, as 1 = 3 = 1 and 2 = 4 = L, we get a symmetric solution
with e1 = e3 =: eH , e2 = e4 =: eL, s12 = s21 = s34 = s43 = 0, s13 = s23 =
s31 = s41 =: sH and s14 = s24 = s32 = s42 =: sL. The system of rst-order
5Here and in all what follows, a subscript "j" accompanying the function f () denotes
a rst derivative with respect to component j, a subscript "jj" a second derivative with
respect to component j, and a subscript "jk" with j 6= k a mixed derivative with respect to
components j and k.
6As pointed out by e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981), the second-order conditions are not
necessarily satised. To guarantee the existence of the pure-strategy equilibrium specied by
the rst-order conditions, the density function h () has to be su¢ ciently at or the e¤ort cost
functions su¢ ciently convex. In what follows, it is assumed that these conditions are fullled
so that the second-order conditions hold.
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conditions then simplies to
w
2
h (0) f1 (x

H ; x

L)  Ce (eH)  0 (= 0; for eH > 0) ; (5)
w
2
h (0) f2 (x

H ; x

L)  LCe (eL)  0 (= 0; for eL > 0) ; (6)
w
2
h (0) f1 (x

H ; x

L) Ks (sH + sL)  0 (= 0; for sH > 0) ; (7)
w
2
h (0) f2 (x

H ; x

L) Ks (sH + sL)  0 (= 0; for sL > 0) ; (8)
where xH = e

H   2sH and xL = eL   2sL.
Before turning to a closer examination of these conditions, it is advisable to
say something about the relation between f1 (xH ; x

L) and f2 (x

H ; x

L). It is, in
this context, true that xH > x

L () f1 (xH ; xL) < f2 (xH ; xL). This ranking of
marginal productivities is due to two reasons. First, if xH exceeds x

L, increasing
xH will be (relatively) less valuable, as f exhibits decreasing returns to e¤ective
e¤ort. Second, the complementarities between e¤ective e¤orts in combination
with xH > x

L rises f2 (x

H ; x

L) more strongly than f1 (x

H ; x

L). The relation
between marginal productivities is extremely helpful in characterizing the tour-
nament equilibrium. Deriving this equilibrium we proceed in three steps, i.e.,
we derive three lemmas that partly build on each other. Let us start with the
rst one:
Lemma 1 There exists no equilibrium with xH = 0 or x

L = 0 (or both).
Proof: Lemma 1 is proved by contradiction. Suppose that, for some k =
H;L, xk = 0. E¤ective e¤ort may equal zero for two reasons. Either productive
e¤ort is positive, but k is fully sabotaged, or productive e¤ort is zero. The rst
case cannot constitute an equilibrium. If k is fully sabotaged, he will always
have an incentive to choose productive e¤ort slightly above , as this e¤ort
level is the highest one leading to no costs for the agent. From the rst-order
conditions, it follows that w2 h (0) fk (x

H ; x

L) = 0. Then, Ks (sH + sL) = 0.
This, however, will only be possible, if ek   2sk > 0 () xk > 0. It can easily
be shown that the second case is also never part of equilibrium. As condition
Ce (0) = 0 holds, it will always be in ks interest to deviate and choose positive
e¤ort, if no sabotage occurs. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Notice that K () being much steeper than C () (footnote 4) implies that
productive e¤orts are substantially higher than destructive e¤orts. From the
fact that there exists no equilibrium with xH = 0 or x

L = 0, it then follows that
xH ; x

L > 0. In words, equilibrium e¤ective e¤orts are always strictly positive.
With this assumption in mind, Lemma 2 can be derived.
Lemma 2 Sabotage is only aimed at the player exerting lower e¤ort. That is,
sH = 0, if e

H > e

L and s

L = 0, if e

L > e

H .
Proof: Again, the lemma is proved by contradiction. Suppose that eH > eL
and sH > 0 together hold. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that, with
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eH > eL, xH < xL can never hold in equilibrium. Let both, eH > eL and xH <
xL, hold and denote the shift in sabotage activities from the high to the low-
ability player that is needed to equate xH and xL by s^. Consider now a shift in
sabotage activities from the high to the low-ability player in the amount of 2s^+,
with  > 0 and  ! 0. This shift leaves sabotage costs unchanged, but changes
the opponent teams performance by
R 0
 s^ [f1 (xL + t; xL)  f2 (xL + t; xL)] dt+R s^+
0
[f1 (xL + t; xL)  f2 (xL + t; xL)] dt. This change in performance is nega-
tive, so the shift in sabotage activities is protable. Further, it is always fea-
sible, as the subsequent calculations will show: Initially, we have (eL   2sL)  
(eH   2sH) = 2s^. Rearranging yields (eL   2sL)   2s^ = (eH   2sH). As
eH   2sH is strictly positive in equilibrium, the term eL   2sL   2s^    is
non-negative for small enough . Hence, it is possible and benecial to shift
sabotage activities in the described way. It can therefore never be the case that,
in equilibrium, eH > eL and xH < xL together hold. Hence, with eH > eL, we
must have xH  xL. Let us turn to the case, where xH = xL. Consider now
a shift of two marginal sabotage units from the high to the low-ability player.
This shift again leaves sabotage costs unchanged. Further, it is protable. The
rst shifted unit does not a¤ect the opponent teams performance. The second,
however, leads to a performance decrease. Note that the shift is also feasible,
for xL > 0. Hence, it cannot be that eH > eL and xH = xL together hold.
Finally, consider the case, where eH > eL, xH > xL and sH > 0. Let sabotage
activities be marginally shifted from the high to the low-ability player. While
e¤ort costs remain unchanged, the associated performance change is given by
f1 (xH ; xL)  f2 (xH ; xL), which is strictly negative. Hence, members of the op-
ponent team always prefer to shift sabotage activities from high to low-ability
players. Further, as xL > 0, these shifts are always possible in equilibrium. As a
result, in equilibrium we must have sH = 0. The proof is completely analogous
for the case eH < eL. This proves Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 has interesting implications. It says that the players exerting low-
est e¤ort are the only ones subject to sabotage. This result is due to two e¤ects,
a decreasing-returns e¤ect and a complementarity e¤ect. The decision of
whom to sabotage depends on the answer to the question of whose e¤ective ef-
fort is most essential for team performance. With the above team performance
function, this question yields an unambiguous answer, namely the players ex-
erting lowest e¤ort. Sabotaging these players is most benecial as, for given
e¤orts of all other players, they have higher marginal productivities and are
more relevant for complementarities. These e¤ects may best be highlighted by
considering an example. Suppose that f (x1; x2) =
p
x1 +
p
x2 + kx1x2, with
k > 0. The parameter k measures the strength of complementarities between x1
and x2. Moreover, let e1 equal 5 and e2 equal 2. Assume further that initially
there is no sabotage, but that a member of the opponent team wants to spend
1 unit of sabotage. Sabotage will then be completely directed at player 2. The
decreasing returns e¤ect implies that it is more benecial to sabotage player 2,
as
p
5   p4 < p2   p1. The complementarity e¤ect also makes sabotaging
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player 2 more worthwhile, as k  5  1 < k  4  2. Hence, both e¤ects work into
the same direction so that it is always player 2 who is sabotaged.
Up to this point, we only said that the player exerting lower e¤ort is subject
to all sabotage activities. What we did not mention was the identity of that
player. In other words, the following question is still unanswered: Does the high
or the low-ability player exert higher e¤ort? Lemma 3 gives an answer.
Lemma 3 The high-ability players exert higher e¤ort than the low-ability ones.
Proof: Suppose that eL > eH . From Lemma 2, it follows that xL > xH .
This implies that f1 (xH ; xL) > f2 (xH ; xL). As a direct consequence, Ce (eH) >
LCe (eL) must also hold. However, this can only be the case, if eH > eL, which
contradicts our initial assumption. Hence, eH > eL must hold so that Lemma
3 is proved.
As high-ability players have a cost advantage, they always exert higher e¤orts
than their low-ability counterparts. As a result, they are not sabotaged so that
the e¤ective e¤ort di¤erence is even higher than the di¤erence in productive
e¤orts.
Finally, the following proposition summarizes the derived results:
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, high-ability players exert higher productive ef-
fort than low-ability players, i.e. eH > e

L > 0. Sabotage activities are only
aimed at the low-ability players.
The model therefore supports the intuition based on the saying from the
introduction. Under quite general conditions, it was shown to be preferable to
aim all sabotage activities at the team members of relatively low ability, for this
reduces the teams performance most signicantly.
4 Conclusion
This note introduced sabotage into a collective tournament. An interesting
result was derived, namely that relatively able players are subject to no sabotage.
This result extremely di¤ers from ndings in individual tournaments (see e.g.
the papers of Chen and Münster), where oftentimes very able players su¤er most
sabotage activities.
Hence, the analysis of collective tournaments may lead to important insights
that are not captured by the extensive analysis of individual tournaments. Eco-
nomic analysis should therefore focus more strongly on the analysis of collective
tournaments. Interesting aspects such as optimal team composition or the opti-
mal division of tournament prizes within teams are, until now, hardly explored.7
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